BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG (DAY 2)
Early on the morning of July 2nd, 1863, Lee met with General James Longstreet who continued to press for a wide swing around
the enemy's left. But Lee, concerned about the absence of J.E.B. Stuart's Cavalry, refuted Longstreet's suggestion. A.P. Hill and
Henry Heth shortly joined the two, and immediately thereafter, Major Gen. John Bell Hood arrived on the scene. Close behind Hood was Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws' division. Still to arrive was the division under Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett. It was very apparent to the newly arrived commanders that things were not well between Longstreet and
Lee. About this time, Confederate scouts returning to camp, reported that Federal pickets were stationed at the southern portion of Cemetery Ridge and that the
Round Tops were unmanned. Lee ordered Longstreet to march his two divisions south and advance them along the Emmitsburg
Road to the northeast, toward Cemetery Ridge.
After overtaking the Federal left, he would attack Cemetery Hill from the south. Meanwhile, A.P. Hill, with the divisions of Major Generals Anderson and Pender, would attack from the west. It was to be a group assault with each Brigade moving in behind the other and striking back to back. Meanwhile, Ewell's Corps in Gettysburg was facing Federal positions to the south. If the opportunity presented itself, he was to make a full scale assault on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill. At about 10 a.m., Lee ordered Longstreet off to carry out his attack plans. But after a while, when he didn't hear any skirmishing taking place, Lee became concerned. Added to his obvious impatience with his leading General, was Lee's physical ailment. It is now believed that he was suffering severe pain and discomfort from the progressing heart disease that would take his life only two years after the war's end. When he finally communicated with Longstreet, he discovered that Longstreet had not wanted to begin his march until Law's Brigade had arrived as his back-up.
Shortly after Longstreet began his advancing march, J.E.B. Stuart finally showed up in camp. He and his men had been on a foray that began on June 25th. Instead of doing the prudent thing and riding back westward to keep in touch with Lee, he chose to ride around Hancock's Federal Corps. In doing so, he placed himself in a precarious position of being unable to communicate with Lee's right flank. Continuing on his trek, he decided to pursue and capture a Federal Wagon Train which he would offer to Lee when he finally showed up at Gettysburg on the 2nd. Lee's initial response at the site of his long
lost Cavalry Commander was that of anger.
Yet, almost as quickly as the anger had set in, it was gone and Lee asked Stuart for his help remarking: "We shall not discuss this matter further."
Meanwhile, Longstreet was marching west on the Chambersburg Pike, turning off on a side road and heading towards Black Horse Tavern on the Hagerstown Road. At the same time, Brig. General Joseph B. Kershaw, leading McLaws' Brigade, marched east toward the Emmittsburg Road. When he came to Herr's Ridge, he realized he could not advance any farther without being seen by the enemy and when Longstreet realized this, he ordered his whole force back, continuing them toward the
Chambersburg Pike, and down another route along Willoughby Run. This delay cost him two very valuable hours. It wasn't until approximately 3:30 p.m., that his Corps began falling into place west of the Emmitsburg Road. Hood's Division was on the right facing the Round Tops and McLaws' on the left opposite Cemetery Ridge. The overwhelming number of Federal troops that
McLaws found in front of him were men from Gen. Daniel Sickles' III Corps.
George Gordon Meade was a graduate of West Point and had served as an Army Engineer in the Mexican War. On June 28th, just days before the historic events at Gettysburg, he was placed in charge of the Army. When he attempted to refuse, he was informed that it was an order, not a request. Now, at Gettysburg, he appeared "careworn and tired."
Through the night and early morning of the 2nd, Federal troops, totaling approximately 95,000, came marching into the small
hamlet. By 9 a.m., most of the Army of the Potomac had been deployed in the irregular shape of a horseshoe. The right consisted of Slocum's XII Corps which held a line along the rocky slope that extended southeast from Culp's Hill along Rock Creek. The curve of the horseshoe was covered by Wadsworth's battle-worn I Corps on Culp's Hill and Howard's XI Corps on Cemetery Hill. At Cemetery Hill, the line bent south, with Hancock's II Corps extending down Cemetery Ridge. Sickles' III Corps was ordered to position itself beyond Hancock on the extreme Federal left. The V Corps under Maj. General George Sykes was
placed in reserve on the Baltimore Pike behind Cemetery Hill. Still to arrive was Maj. General John Sedgwick's VI Corps.
Unbeknownst to Meade, on the morning of July 2nd, the every important Round Tops were undefended. The night before, the
bulk of General John W. Geary's division of the XII Corps had been ordered to move south on Cemetery Ridge. Two of his
regiments had spent the night on Little Round Top but were ordered off to Culp's Hill the morning of the 2nd. He was supposed to be relieved on Cemetery Ridge by
Sickles' III Corps. Geary was quite aware of the strategic importance of Little Round Top. Before he left, he sent two separate notes to Sickles explaining the necessity of manning that position. Sickles ignored them both. Unable to wait any longer, Geary left and Little Round Top was left unmanned...a fact soon reported to General Lee. Sickles instead decided to place his troops a half mile north of the Round Tops. He believed that the high ground, which consisted of a Peach Orchard and situated about a half-mile to the west was more of a threat, especially if the enemy were to set their guns there. In an attempt to locate any Confederate troops in the area of Pitzer's Woods, he sent out skirmishers... four companies of the lst U.S. Sharpshooter's under Col. Hiram Berdan. Across the Emmitsburg Road, they ran into Confederate skirmishers. After a brief fight, Berdan withdrew and reported to Sickles that the woods were indeed full of Rebels. In reality, there were only three regiments of General Cadmus Wilcox's Alabama brigade, the far right of Hill's Corps.
Sickles decided to advance toward the Emmitsburg Road and at 3 p.m., the III Corps pushed forward toward the Peach Orchard and the woods. Meade was unaware of any such advance and when he heard the sound of gunfire, he instructed General Sykes and his V Corps up from the Baltimore Pike in support of Sickles. The VI Corps would then move up into Sykes' position. Riding out on the field with Brig. General Gouveneur K. Warren, Meade saw first hand the horrific scene: The right flank consisting of the divisions of Brig. Generals Andrew A. Humphreys and David B. Birney were totally exposed. Meade's anger at Sickles' poor deployment would have to wait and he made a mental note to deal with his commander at a later time.
If tensions were high between the Union commanders, things weren't much different between the Confederates. Upon realizing
his plan of advancement was thwarted by Sickles' Corps, McLaws immediately sent word several times to Longstreet about his
plight. Longstreet's only reply was that when the time came, he (McLaws) must attack...no matter what! At the same time, Hood on the far right, was undergoing similar problems. From his position in Pitzer's Woods, Hood could see Birney's Troops, supported by a second Georgia Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson. U. S. Sharpshooters on the lower slope of Big Round Top opened fire on the 15th Alabama, stationed on the far right of Law's line. In an attempt to clean them out, the 15th and 47th Alabama charged up the hill. It was a tough struggle up the craggy and thickly wooded slopes of the hill but eventually, with the enemy retreating, the Alabama troops set foot on the top of Big Round Top. No sooner had he gotten to the top than Colonel William B. Oates was told that Gen. Hood had been wounded and that Law was now in command. Law's first order was for Oates to leave his hard-won spot on Big Round Top and take Little Round Top.
On his way back down the hill, Oates was joined by the 4th Alabama and the 4th and 5th Texas who had been skirmishing
around Devil's Den and the western base of Big Round Top. Not seeing any Union troops, they made their way across to the
base of Little Round Top and began to ascend the hill. Suddenly from behind the rocks in front of them came an overwhelming fire.
In reality, the Federals had only minutes before fallen into place. Had it not been for the sound wisdom of Gen. Warren, who had
found Little Round Top unmanned and requested troops be moved forward, the hill would have belonged to the Confederates. In support, General Sykes sent portions of his V Corps to assist in holding the hill. Brig. General James Barnes was ordered to send a brigade to assist, but when
Barnes could not be found, Colonel Strong Vincent, commanding the lead brigade stepped forward and responded to the request for deployment to Little Round Top. The last of Vincent's Regiments to climb the hill was the 20th Maine. Addressing its Commander, Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Vincent made it clear that the 20th Maine was the extreme left of the Union line. "You understand. You are to hold this ground at all costs."
Within minutes of these men arriving on the hill, Oates and his Confederates began their assault. Hiding behind the natural rocks, Chamberlain's troops methodically rose and fired...sending the Confederates reeling back. Undaunted, they charged again and again, only to be repulsed again and again. For an hour and a half, the battle waged on. When Chamberlain realized that his men were down to their last cartridges, he ordered them to fix bayonets and charge before the Rebels had a change to regroup.
Down the hill they came, yelling and screaming, brandishing their bayonets and taking the Rebels totally by surprise. Although the 20th Maine had lost 130 of its 386 men during the assault, it had won a very important battle. They had retained control of Little Round Top and had captured many Confederate prisoners to boot.
On the far right, Vincent's Brigade wasn't so lucky. The 16th Michigan was falling apart under the severe attack of the 4th and
5th Texas. While trying to rally his men, Colonel Vincent had been mortally wounded and all seemed lost. But, thanks once more to Gen. Warren, who came to the rescue with reinforcements, the day was saved. Standing on the top of Little Round Top, one could see the savage fighting going on in Devil's Den and Plum Run Valley, which for obvious reasons would be renamed "The Valley of Death."
Stationed on a ridge nearby were regiments from New York, Pennsylvania, Maine and Indiana as well as artillery guns from the 4th New York Battery. It had been a shell from one of these guns that had shattered Hood's arm.
Confederate troops from Texas and Arkansas stormed into Devil's Den and the Valley of Death and were immediately picked off
by Union troops on Little Round Top. Rebel soldiers were in the meantime, involved in a desperate struggle to unman the guns above Devil's Den. The battle swayed back and forth and eventually, the Confederates overtook the ground and captured three of the Union's guns. During this time, the struggle at the Peach Orchard with Birney's line continued.
At about 5:30 p.m., Longstreet allowed McLaws' division to move up and assist Anderson in his assault on the Federal line at the Wheatfield. Also assisting were several regiments from Kershaw's Brigade and a George Brigade under the command of Paul J. Semmes, brother of Raphael Semmes. The Federals stood long and hard at the Wheatfield, but when Brig. General James Barnes mistakenly ordered a withdrawal, he ended up leaving a large gap in the Union line. This forced the rest of the Union troops in the Wheatfield to pull back. More Federal units came up to take their place and the battle for control of the Wheatfield went back and forth, with the battlefield changing hands several times. Finally, when a fresh V Corps division moved in, they were able to restore Birney's line between the Wheatfield and the Devil's Den.
Meanwhile the Peach Orchard had been under severe attack from the men of Mississippi, commanded by Gen. William Barksdale. With 1600 men, Barksdale had managed to push through the Federal line and force the Yankees to retreat. During the Peach Orchard battle, General Sickles received his now famous wound. He had been on horseback near the Trostle farm when a solid shot hit his right leg, totally destroying it from the knee down. The leg was later amputated and he would outlive most of the commanders from both North and South.
With the III Corps line broken, the remainder of the Federal lines became vulnerable and so Meade ordered reinforcements to move up. To Little Round Top, he sent two V Corps Brigades. From Culp's Hill came the bulk of the XII Corps. As well, Abner Doubleday's and John Robinson's Brigades of the I Corps came along with Sedgwick's VI Corps. Hancock remained at Cemetery Ridge with the II Corps.
At the Trostle Farm, Union Batteries appeared to be in danger of being overrun by Barksdale's men, who had continued on their assault from the Peach Orchard. Lt. Colonel Freeman McGilvery of Maine was instrumental in getting the 9th Massachusetts Battery in place to hold this line against the Confederates until reinforcements could arrive. Help came from the XII Corps and struck the center of Barksdale's Brigade forcing them back.
In the North, at Cemetery Ridge, a gap had occurred when one of the Divisions had moved off to the Wheatfield. Now, Wilcox's Confederate Brigade was threatening that spot. Hancock immediately ordered the lst Minnesota to attack and attack they did. With bayonets drawn, they hurled themselves down at the Rebels, forcing them to withdraw. This left only one Confederate Brigade on the field, that of Ambrose Wright. When they attempted to gain the crest of Cemetery Ridge, they found their advancement blocked by newly arrived Federal troops.
Two other Confederate Brigades under William Mahone and Dorsey Pender failed to advance and Lee's opportunity at Cemetery Ridge came to an end at 8 p.m.
General Ewell and his troops had been ordered to pin down the Federal forces on Culp's and Cemetery Hill and keep them from going to the aid of the other units under attack. All day long, his Divisions sat and waited for the word from him to attack. The Federals in the meantime had the whole day to fortify their positions. For some unknown reason, Ewell had not heard the opening shots of Longstreet's attack and when he did finally hear it, instead of moving forward with Infantry, Ewell chose to fire Artillery shells at Culp's Hill and Cemetery Ridge for the next two hours.
When at last he had decided to launch his attack, it was just about sunset and he had failed in his orders of pining down the
Federals, for almost half of the units on Cemetery Ridge had left to reinforce the line from the Peach Orchard to Devil's Den.
One of his Brigades was to strike Culp's
Hill and the two remaining Brigades would attack Cemetery Ridge from different
directions. What happened next was no different than what had happened continuously throughout the day...Federal
reinforcements would arrive just in time to fill the gaps and in doing so, they would check the advancement of the oncoming
enemy and hold their positions. By 10:30 p.m. all was quiet and the Confederates were pulling back. A short while later, General Meade called a meeting with his commanding Generals. The general consensus was to stay and fight and as the meeting closed, Meade predicted that if Lee were to attack on the next day, that it would be on the center of the Federal line. At that time, he didn't realize just how prophetic that statement would be.
So ends the story of the 2nd Day of Gettysburg.
Some of the sources I used in putting this together were:
1. Time Life Series: The Civil War, "Gettysburg."
2. "High Tide at Gettysburg by Glenn Tucker.
3. "Gettysburg: A Journey in Time," by William A. Frassanito.
4. "They Met at Gettysburg," by General Edward J. Stackpole.
Also used were several of the Morningside Publications of their "Gettysburg"
magazine.
